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Abstract 
 
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the implications of financial liberalisation for 
stability and economic growth has come under increased scrutiny. One strand of literature posits a 
positive relationship between financial liberalisation and economic growth and development.  
However, others emphasise the link between financial liberalisation is intrinsically associated   with 
financial instability which may be harmful to economic growth and development. This study 
assesses  linkages between financial instability, financial liberalisation, financial development and 
economic growth in 41 African countries for the period 1985-2010. The results suggest that  
financial development and financial liberalisation have positive effects on financial instability. The 
findings also reveal that economic growth reduces financial instability and the magnitude of 
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The financial crisis of 2008 cannot be viewed as a shock that was subsequently followed by 
struggles from actors that were rational (Asongu, 2015a). On the contrary, it demonstrates the 
imperative of social norms and conventions like models of management adopted to meet-up the 
challenges of uncertainty. In essence, the failure of political scientists and economists to forecast the 
crisis is at the same time embarrassing and very dismal.  
 
Accordingly, the crisis has gone a long way to reminding scholars that we are living in a world full 
of risks and uncertainties, which conventional models of market and human behaviour are unable to 
effectively predict. Nevertheless, rational economic agents are still assumed to follow instrumental, 
consistent and rational norms, and this is viewed as rationally logical. However, where the 
parameters are for the most part not able to predict future events, as is the case in the real world, this 
conjecture becomes untenable. This situation has allowed market players and policy makers to 
become dependent on a plethora of social conventions that stabilise uncertain environments (Nelson 
& Katzenstein, 2011).  
 
In the light of the recent financial crisis, the great ambitions of liberalisation policies and their 
relevance to economic prosperity have increasingly come under scrutiny, particularly in developing 
countries. According to some experts, the financial meltdown has exposed the shortcomings of 
liberalisation economic strategies (Kose et al., 2006; Goldberg & Veitch, 2010; Agbloyor et al., 
2013; Asongu, 2014; Kose et al., 2011). In essence, emerging economies that experienced 
considerable inflows of capital during the past decades have been confronted with the challenging 
task of managing any consequential external shocks, which may be exacerbated by financial 
liberalisation, when those financial flows contract. Accordingly, the economic downturn has 
encouraged renewed interest in the theoretical underpinnings of financial liberalisation, especially 




Rodrik & Subramanian (2009) take the view that the theoretical underpinnings of financial 
globalisation are less convincing today. They consider that the global financial meltdown and its 
                                                 
1
 The theoretical underpinnings of globalization sustain that liberalization should foster efficient capital allocation at the 
international level as well as the sharing of risks. According to the narrative, less developed nations should benefit more 
because they are considerably scarce in capital and rich in labour. Moreover, undeveloped nations are relatively more 
volatile with respect to output, compared to more industrialized or advanced economies (Asongu, 2013a, b, 2015b; 
Kose et al., 2011). These underpinnings are also relevant in our understanding of relationships between bank size and 
financial access. For instance, bank size is negatively related to banking sector efficiency (Banya and Biekpe, 2017), 
partly because lack of competition in the banking sector decreases financial intermediation efficiency (Biekpe, 2011). 
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consequences, has resulted in the benefits of financial engineering becoming questionable. 
According to Rodrik & Subramanian (2009), financial liberalisation has substantially failed to 
address the needs of investment and growth in less developed countries. Thus, nations that have 
experienced remarkable rates of economic growth have been those that have also been less reliant 
on international capital flows. They sustain that globalisation has failed to smooth consumption and 
mitigate volatility. Clearly, in a situation where financial flows in an economy are not able to be 
quickly moved from one financial centre to another, due to an absence of financial liberalisation, 
economic volatility could be reduced in the economy. Alternatively, if financial flows are able to 
move rapidly across international borders, those economies losing the flows may have their banking 
systems and industrial bases undermined.  
 
When the current wave of liberalisation began in the 1980s, developing and developed nations 
experienced considerable improvements in cross border financial flows. However, these flows were 
accompanied by currency crises. These negative outcomes have resulted in a renewed interest and 
focus in policy and academic making circles on the rewards of liberalisation. Some protagonists 
take the view that, relative to more advanced countries, undeveloped countries which responded by 
substantially opening-up their capital accounts have been more vulnerable to external shocks (Kose 
et al., 2011; Henry, 2007; Asongu, 2014; Motelle & Biekpe, 2015; Ansart &  Monvoisin, 2017). 
Despite a general consensus regarding the benefits of trade openness (Kose et al., 2006), there is an 
increasingly polarized debate on the effects of financial liberalisation (Asongu and De Moor, 2017).  
 
In Africa, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, against a background of rapidly deteriorating 
economic and financial conditions, many African countries undertook far reaching economic 
reforms (see Aryeetey, 1994; Collier, 1993; Ekpenyony 1994; Kesekende and Atingi Ego, 1999; 
Khan and Reinhart, 1990). These programs that were supported by the World Bank and the IMF 
focussed on  structurally adjusting economies in order to achieve private sector led growth, via a 
market based system (The World Bank, 1994). Financial liberalisation was a significant component 
of these reforms, facilitating the deregulation of the foreign sector capital account and domestic 
financial sector, enabling the domestic stock market sector to be decoupled from the domestic 
financial sector (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003). Although the reform succeeded in liberalising 
the financial markets, the positive impact on growth and investment has been patchy, while the 
African financial system remains shallow and relatively underdeveloped (Reinhart and Tokatlidis, 
2003). Indeed, financial liberalisation appeared to engender greater instability and crises, 




Financial instability can manifest itself in a number of ways, such as in banking failures, asset price 
volatility or a collapse in market liquidity. The potential outcome of such damaging events could be 
severe disruption to a country’s payment and settlement system and thus destabilisation of the 
economy in general. Financial instability affects the real (or productive) sector due to its links with 
the financial sector. It therefore has the potential to cause significant macroeconomic costs, as it 
negatively impacts on production, consumption and investment and consequently inhibits broader 
economic objectives such as growth and development. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) confirmed 
this negative outcome, finding financial instability was positively associated with financial 
development.  This implies that safeguarding financial stability and identifying vulnerabilities 
within a financial system is essential for financial development. Some of these vulnerabilities have 
macroeconomic dimensions, such as changes in the conditions of household and corporate sector 
balance sheets and developments in credit and asset markets, all of which have the potential to 
affect the level and distribution of financial risk within the economy.  
 
Arguably, the need to safegauard financial stability is paramount, as this would make it easier to 
identify any vulnerabilities within a financial system and reduce such vulnerabilities occuring in the 
first place. Many leading African economists believed the 2008 financial crisis could not affect 
Africa because its banking and capital markets were not fully integrated in global markets. 
Consequently, they considered the impact of the crisis on Africa would be minimal. However, the 
crisis had a substantial adverse effect on the financial sector of Africa’s economies, particularly the 
larger economies (see Murinde, 2010). 
This paper, examines the effects of financial liberalisation, financial development and 
economic growth on financial instablity in Africa. In particular, it investigates whether financial 
instability has an impact on economic growth in African countries and whether the financial 
development and liberalisation that has occured in Africa is linked to financial instability. Further, 
whether the relationship between financial development and financial instability is more 
pronounced in the pre-liberalisation or post-liberalisation period.  These questions are significant 
and contemporaneous, as instability is an inherent feature of financial systems. There is also clear 
evidence in the economic literature that financial liberalisation raises economic costs, in terms of 





These issues are clearly relevant given that financial stability preservation has become an important 
item on the agenda of international financial institutions. These issues are  important for African 
countries as their financial development is rapid and there is an urgency for them to integrate their 
economies into the international financial structure and international financial markets (Alagidede 
et al., 2011). The urgency arises due to the need to fund their domestic expansion and growth 
programmes with international capital, as their domestic capital sources are relatively limited and 
slow to generate. This is why it is important to examine and evaluate the factors that may result in 
financial instability, as any instability could inhibit economic growth in these developing 
economies.  
 
This paper adopts a dynamic panel method to illustrate the effect of the relationship between 
financial development, liberalisation and economic growth on the financial instability of a sample 
of 41 African countries from 1985 to 2010. The results indicate that financial development and 
liberalisation have a statistically significant effect on financial instability. However, financial 
instability is shown to have a harmful effect on economic growth, this being more pronounced in 
the pre-financial liberalisation period compared to the post-financial liberalisation period. 
 
There are a limited number of studies directly linking financial instability, financial development 
and economic growth (Reinhart and Kamnsky, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiach, 1988; 
Guillaumont and Kpodar, 2004;  Loayza and Ranciere, 2004). In this paper the focus is restricted 
soley to African countries which have been liberalising and developing their financial sectors in 
order to become efficient. However, both financial development and financial liberalisation are also 
included in the analysis. The links and outocmes are verified in both the pre- and  post-financial 
liberalisation periods and  a continuous financial instability index is constructed by applying  a 
principal component analysis  on a number of financial instability indicators.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 is an outline of the theoretical background and  literature 
review, Section 3 describes the methodology and data used. Section 4 presents the results and 
Section 5 summarises the main conclusions.   
 
2.  Literature Review  
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The role of the financial system is an essential one for any economy, essentially because funds  are 
channeled to those economic agents having productive investment prospects (Schumpeter (1911)
2
.  
Earlier scholars such as Goldsmith (1969), Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) found a positive 
relationship between financial development and economic growth.  Recently, similar results were 
achieved by  King and Levine (1992, 1993), Levine (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Shahbaz 
(2009).  However, even if this relationship exists, an economic system must perform at the optimum 
level, if not an economy cannot operate efficiently, consequently hindering  economic growth. The 
principal obstacle to an efficient functioning financial system is asymmetric information (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1992; Tchamyou and Asongu, 2017), which leads to two problems in the financial 
system: adverse selection and moral hazard. However, attempts can be made to mitigate these 
problems. With adverse selection, Akerlof (1970) proposes the lemons problem analysis, requiring 
governments to screen out good credit risks from bad credit risks. With the moral hazard problem, 
governments must impose restrictions on borrowers in order that borrowers do not engage in 
behaviours which reduce their probability of loan repayment. However, any government 
intervention in the operation of a market economy may distort the signalling mechanisms required 
for effecient resource allocation, even though the intervention may be needed to rectify the 
consequences of assymetric information. This internvention may in turn result in governemt failure. 
Further, the intervention by governments in the banking system, such as finiancial support for the 
banks, could exacerbate moral hazard, as the banks may percieve the intervention will result in 
them not having to bear the full burden of their risk-taking activity. Thus there risk taking activity 
might be encouraged by the intervention. 
 
Over the two last decades, the institutional structure of the financial system has been evolving in 
order to alleviate the problem of asymmetric information and to avoid financial instability 
difficulties. Financial instability occurs when shocks to the financial system interfere with 
information flows, the financial system can then no longer perform its function of mobilising 
savings, facilitating the exchange of goods and services, reducing risks and allocating resources to 
productive sectors. Deprived of these savings, the productive sector may reduce its spending, 
causing economic activity to contract, which can be severe, as highlighted by Keynes (1936) when 
discussing the impact on aggregate demand and employment. The resulting fluctuations in 
economic activity may have additional negative consequences. Schumpeter (1911) notes these 
flucatuations may affect the introduction of new products, processes and management methods. If 
                                                 
2
 According to Schumpeter, financial services are necessary for the development of entrepreneurship, the improvement 
of technology, productivity, and the acceleration of growth. 
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the financial crisis is harsh enough, it could therefore lead to a complete breakdown in the 
functioning of financial markets, which in turn exacerbates financial instability.  
 
Minsky (1992b) examained the potential links between financial system fragility and speculative 
investment finance. The author posited  that “the internal dynamics of capitalist economies leads, 
over a period dominated by the full successful operation of a capitalist economy, to the emergence 
of financial structures which are conducive to debt deflation, the collapse of asset values and deep 
depressions” (Minsky, 1992b). According to Minsky (1980:215), instability underlies the 
appearance of stability in the financial markets. The inherent de-stabilising characteristics  in the 
capitalist system implied by Minsky (1992b), suggest that whatever approach is used by 
governments to rectify the consequences maybe unlikely to overcome them. During periods of 
stability, when stock prices are rising and higher than the interest rate, investors are therefore lured 
into taking more risks, which leads them to borrow more and to over pay for assets. This motive is 
underpinned and reinforced by the nature of the capitalist system, whereby rent- seeking and profit 
is the ultimate goal. 
 
Blejer (2006), points out two reasons for financial instability in the financial sector. Firstly, severe 
financial instability occurs when there is a dramatic growth in the volume of financial 
intermediation. Secondly, industrial and financial globalisation, which facilitates the integration of 
financial institutions and consequently increases the systemic risk. The complexity of financial 
instruments is a further reason for financial instability. Due to the complexity of such instruments 
such as collateralized debt obligations: a popular financial instrument, which was at the heart of the 
2008 crisis (Mackenzia, 2001).   
 
Eichengreen, (2004) discussed four causes of financial instability and crisis, these being  
unsustainable macroeconomic policies
3
, government and countries experiencing crises due to the 
use of inconsistent and unsustainable policies (Krugman, 1971). The third cause was the fragility of 
the financial system. Financial weakness
4
 and the prevalence of currency mismatches in the 
financial system as pointed out by Goldstein and Turner, (2003) appeared to be the key factor 
promoting financial fragility. Flaws in the structure of international financial markets were found by 
Keynes (1933), Nurkse (1944) and Brouwer (2001), who noted the destructive effects of 
destabilising international speculation in the great depression. The final cause was weakness in the 
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 Mussa’s (2003) treatment of the recent Argentine case.  
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institutional framework and in domestic governance and corporate structures. Although these may 
be considered individual and separate causes, they clearly interact with one another, one cause thus 
leading to another, or rather leading to a consequence. For example, an unsustainable policy may 
lead to a fragile financial system and currency instability, followed by financial instability.  
Eichengreen et al (2001) studied the output losses due to crises with a sample of 21 middle and high 
income countries over a 120 year period. The study also covered a large sample of emerging 
markets for a shorter period starting in 1973. They found a loss from the average crisis of almost 
9% of GDP. This was 1% per year less than the estimate of  Dobson and Hufbauer (2001) for 
emerging markets and developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s.  Caprio and Klingebel (1996) 
estimated that the banking crises cost 2.4% of output per year for each year of their duration.  
Goldstein et al. (2000) estimated the currency crisis cost 3% of output per year of their duration in 
low inflation countries and 6% of output per year of their duration in high inflation countries. 
 
The general consensus is that policies that limit financial instability by restrictive financial 
transactions are likely to have costs as well as benefits (see, Bakaert and Harvey 2000; Levin, 
Henry, 2000). This may be due to the negative impact on essential market signalling mechanisms 
mentioned above, resulting from government intervention. However, financial liberalisation has a 
positive impact, in facilitating financial development and a significant effect on economic growth. 
The latter was evidenced by Ranciere et al. (2006), who decomposed the effect of financial 
liberalisation into two parts: a direct effect on growth (which has a positive effect) and an indirect 
effect through the crises model (which has a negative effect) with the positive growth effect 
outweighing the negative effect of the crisis. Nevertheless, liberalised financial markets can exhibit 
extreme volatility, resulting in financial crises which can have a dramatic impact on economic 
prosperity (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2000; Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996, Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999, Dimitras et al., 2015).  The potential negative outcomes of liberalisation are 
also noted by Martin and Rey (2005) in that, stock market liberalisation and financial frictions in 
asset markets interact to generate either investment booms or financial crashes. Further, 
Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2004a, 2004b) noted financial liberalisation leading to less screening by 
banks, resulting in boom-bust credit cycles. 
 
In contrast to the above, some studies examined financial instability by analysing the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth, such as Guillaumont and Kpodar (2004), 
Loayza and Ranciere (2004) and Eggoh (2008). Eggoh (2008) revealed that financial instability has 
a negative impact on economic growth only in the short term. However, financial development 
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affects economic growth postiviely  in the short and long terms. Bonifigliol and Mendocine (2004) 
concluded that financial instability is detrimental for economic performance, with the effect of a 
financial crisis being more dangerous in less developed and closed economies due to the poor 
quality of institutions, compared to the liberalised and open economies of advanced countries. This 
links with one of Eichengreen’s, (2004) four causes of financial instability and crisis, namely: 
weakness in the institutional framework. This is relevant in the context of less devleoped 
economies, as a weak, undeveloped and immature instututional framework could act as a catlayst 
for an  economic shock, whether internal or external, such as a currency crisis. Meanwhile Loayza 
and Ranciere (2004) found a positive relationship in the long run between financial development 
and growth against a negative nexus in the short run. However, they note the variation of the 
financial development effect on economic growth between the long and short run is strongly related 
to financial fragility, which they measured via banking crises.  
 
3. Data  
The sample to be used consists of annual observations of 41 African countries selected on the basis 
of data availability during the period 1985-2010. The source of the data is primarily from the Africa 
Development Indicators of the World Bank (World Bank, 2010)  and Chinn and Ito (2002). We 
would describe various indexes used in the empirical analysis as the financial instability and 
financial development indexes, both built using factoring analysis. 
 
Index of financial instability 
Recent studies, such as Gracia Herrero et al. (2003) and  Cihak (2007) have used the banking crises 
as a proxy  for financial instability. However,  there are problems using this as an  indicator because 
it is difficult to accurately identify the precise timing of the crises as noted by Caprio and 
Klingebiel, (1996). Crises are taken into consideration only when they are severe enough to trigger 
market events, although when they are successfully constrained by prompt corrective policies they 
are ignored. By only taking banking crises into account,  instability in other parts of the financial 
system is therefore neglected.  
 
To overcome these problems, Guillaumout and Kpodar (2004) and Loayza and Ranciere, (2004)  
constructed  an indicator of financial instability by measuring financial development which is the 
standard deviation residual for each seven year period issued from the estimate of the financial 
development indicator trend over the study period. This means the index  of financial instability is 
calculated from the standard deviation of the residual of the financial development variable 
11 
 
regressed on its delayed value and trend. Loayza and Ranciere (2004) calculated the standard 
deviation from financial development growth, whereas  Eggoh Jude (2008), measured financial 
instability through a cyclical component of the financial development index.   
This paper follows the method proposed by Klomp and Haan, (2009), which  constructed a 
continous financial instability indicator, by applying factoring analysis on a number of financial 
stability indicators. The principal reason for building a composite index is to avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity
5
 that occurs when introducing simultaneously several financial instability variables 
that are highly correlated amongst each other.  The principal component analysis method involves a 
mathematical procedure that transforms a number of correlated variables into a small number of 
uncorrelated variables called principal components  (Tchamyou, 2016).  The first principal 
component accounts for as much of the variability in the data as possible, with each succeeding 
component accounting for as much of the remaining variability as possible.  The method thus 
generates those linear combinations of object measure (called eigenvectors), which express the 
greatest statistical variances over the entire object under consideration.  This is particularly useful 
when they are hiding between different object measures. 
 
The data consists of commonly used financial stability indicators that are composites of variables 
taken from the banking system’s balance sheet, such as domestic credit provided by banks, credit 
provided to the private sector and liabilities liquidity. It is important to include this liquidity 
measure, as large variations in bank liquidity may indicate a crisis. In the same way, credit growth 
is often included in models which explain banking crisis (Beck et al. 2006).   
 
Risk and return indicators such as the real interest rate and interest rate spread are included to show 
if financial risk rises or decreases, thus possibly distressing the stability of the financial sector.  
Monetary authority indicators take into account variables such as money and quasi money (M2) as a 
percentage  of GDP, as huge money supply changes may indicate the existence of financial and or 
economic problems in general (see Table 1).   
 
The first principal component of the three variables accounts for 83% of their overall variance and, 
as expected, is highly correlated with each individual measure included. Specifically, the correlation 
between the first principal component and a change in the domestic credit provided by the banks is 
0.90, the correlation between the change in credit to the private sector is 0.83 and the change in 
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 Multi-collinearity refers to a situation in which two or more explanatory variables in a multiple regression model are 
highly correlated   
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liquid liabilities is 0.77, and  its correlation with M2 is 0.67 (See Table 1).  Figure 1 shows the scree 
plot of the eigenvalues, indicating the numbers of components that have to represent financial 
instability. According to the Kaiser criterion, the component with the eigenvalues above one should 
be selected.  In this study the test suggested the selection of three components.  Further, the first 
principal component was then used to derive a weight (scores) for the financial instability index.  
Index of financial instability = (Change in domestic credit by banks*0.52) + (Change in credit to 
private sector*0.50) + (Change in Liquid Liabilities* 0.49) + (Change in money and quasi money 
(M2) as % GDP*0.46) + (0.17* Change in real interest rate) + (Change in interest rate 
spread*0.10), 
where the financial instability index is the value of the aggregate financial instability measure and 
the score coefficient has been regarded as weights, the source of the various variables is the World 
Development indicators (2010).  For ease of analysis, in Table 2, the countries in the sample were 
classified into three categories, depending on whether they had a high instability: high being an 
index great than 0 and moderate instability being an index less than 0. Countries with the index less 
than or equal to -0.25 are classified as low financial instability index.  More specifically, the 
classification depends on the range of periods from 1985-1990, 1991-2000, and 2001-2010.  The 
first relevant point from this table is that for most countries in the sample, the instability pattern has 
changed significantly over time. For example, over the period 1985-1990, Nigeria had a low 
financial instability index, and from 1991-2000 it moved to a moderate instability. However, over 
the period 2001-2010 it had a low financial instability index.  The second point is that most African 
countries are classified as highly or moderately unstable, meaning their financial sectors are very 
volatile.  
 
Index of financial liberalisation  
 For the financial liberalisation index, the index for capital account openness was used. This is an 
index being developed by Chinn and Ito (2007) and updated in 2010 by the same authors. They 
used the data reported in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
published by the IMF (2010) on the existence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current and 
capital accounts (where the latter is measured as the proportion of the previous five years without 
control) and the requirement to surrender export proceeds in order to capture the intensity of control 
on capital account transactions. Their index of openness is the first standardised principal 
component of these variables, and in practice it ranges from -2.0 in the case of the most control to 




Index of financial development  
The aggregate financial development index was constructed using the principal component analysis 
from the main financial development indicators, which in Africa is from the banking system: 
namely, liquid liabilities as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Money supply (M2) as 
a percentage of GDP and domestic private credit to the banking sector as a percentage of GDP 
(Enowbi and Mlambo, 2010).  It would be expected that these financial development variables 
would be positive and significantly correlated with the index of financial development, while at the 
same time being positively correlated with the index of financial instability.  
 
Following Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), macroeconomic control variables are included 
such as inflation, a change in the term of trade and government expenditure. These could account 
for adverse and external shocks that affect the economy and which can increase the financial system  
instability. For example, by affecting the solvency of borrowers, by increasing uncertainty, or by 
unexpected and excessive exposure to foreign risk (Goldstein et al.2000). GDP per capita is also 
included and the growth of GDP is  to control whether the detrimental effect of financial instability 
is channelled through the instability of economic prosperity.  Table 3 presents descriptive statistics 
of the variables. 
 
4. Methodology  
Empirical specification 
This section discusses the empirical model used to estimate the relationship between financial 
instability, financial development and economic growth. In particular, it is important to identify the 
impact of economic growth on financial instability, taking into account financial development and 
financial liberalisation. To examine this relationship further, a dynamic panel model is estimated, 
based on a balanced panel of data between 1985 to 2010. To test this hypothesis, the econometric 
specification is expressed as follows: 
     ,                      
where i and t denote country and time period respectively. FInst  is the index of financial 
instability , Flib is the   capital account openness index, Gr  represents growth of GDP , while 
Fdev  is the aggregate index of financial development. As explained above, a composite index of 
financial development is used, incorporating M2, private sector credit and liquid liabilities, all as 
ratios to GDP.  The key reason for building composite indexes is to avoid the problem of multi-
collinearity that occurs when simultaneously introducing several financial variables which are 
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highly correlated amongst each other. The principal component and factor analysis which are 
methods for data reduction are ways that can be considered when dealing with multicollinearity, 
even though econometric theory suggests many other procedures could solve the problem. This 
study uses the principal components method as it offers many advantages. Apart from helping to 
reduce multicollinearity, improving parsimony and improving the measurement of indirectly 
observed concepts, it makes economic sense by aiding the re-conceptualisation of the meaning of 
the predictor in the regression model. 
 
X is a vector of control variables that include: the inflation rate, changes in the terms of trade, 
output gaps, and government expenditure.  The terms i  and ti ,  respectively denote a country 
effect capturing unobserved country characteristics and an error term. Equation (1) poses a 
dynamics error component model. There are substantial complications in estimating this model 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In both the fixed and random settings, the lagged dependent 
variable is correlated with the error term, even if the disturbances are not autocorrelated. Arellano 
and Bond (1991) developed a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator that solves the 
problems using the first difference of the equation.  
 
The problems of possible endogeneity bias due to interaction between the financial instability and 
financial liberalisation and development, autocorrelation, individual specific heteroscedasticity, and 
omitted variable bias are overcome by employing the system GMM-estimator developed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), which relies on using instrumental variables. The system GMM 
estimator combines equations in first difference with equation in levels, using lagged internal 
instruments in difference equations.  The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on whether 
lagged values of the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the financial instability 
regression. This issue is addressed by considering two specification tests suggested by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995).  
 
The first is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the 
instruments by analysing the sample analogy of the moment conditions used in the estimation 
process. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model. The second test examines 
the null hypothesis that the error term εi,t is not serially correlated. As in the case of the Sargan test, 
the model specification is supported when the null hypothesis is not rejected. In the system 
15 
 
specification a test is made to ascertain whether the differenced error term (that is, the residual of 
the regression in differences) is second-order serially correlated. First-order serial correlation of the 
differenced error term is expected even if the original error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless 
the latter follows a random walk. Second-order serial correlation of the differenced residual 
indicates that the original error term is serially correlated and follows a moving average process at 
least of order one. This would reject the appropriateness of the proposed instruments (and would 
call for higher-order lags to be used as instruments). The GMM model has been used in recent 
openness and financial development literature (Asongu, 2013b; Batuo & Asongu, 2015).  
                          
5. Findings  
Table 4 reports the estimation results of the effect of financial instability on economic growth, 
financial developement and liberalisation. Column 1 provides an estimate of the  impact of financial 
instability on economic growth, taking into account the effect of financial liberalisation. The 
findings suggest that financial instability has a postive affect on  financial liberalisation meaning the 
liberalisation process tends to increase financial instablility. However, it has an inverse effect on 
economic growth, confirming  the findings of Demrguc-Kunt and Detragiach’s (1998).  
 
Column 2 takes into account financial development, the results showing that its association with 
financial instability is positive and significant,  while the effect on economic growth is negative and 
significant. It is interesting to see that the marginal effect of financial development on financial 
instability is more pronounced (a positive sign) than that of financial liberalisation.   
 
When the two variables (financial development and liberalisation) are both included in the 
estimation, (see column 3), the results concerning the effects of economic growth on financial 
liberalsiation  and development on financial instability do not change dramatically. Financial 
development and liberalisation has a favourable impact on financial instability with the effects of 
financial liberalisation being greater than the effect of  financial development, while economic 
growth has an opposite effect. These results suggest how instability is intrinsically linked to the 
financial sector. It is noted that the positive link between financial instability and financial 
liberalisation and development tends to affect the nexus between finance and growth by damaging 
economic growth . The development and efficiency of  the financial sector is riddled with continous 




With regard to the other explanatory variables, the output gap has the correct sign, is positive and 
significant in all the columns. The real income per capita, government size and inflation have  
mixed results and the terms of trade shock has the opposite sign, but is not statistically  significant. 
In Table 5, the sample is divided  into two, with account taken of the years in which the countries 
were financially  liberalised and the years in which they were not.  In the year of liberalisations, the 
impact of economic growth and financial development on financial instability is less than is the case 
in the year in which the financial sector was not liberalised. Hence, results also reveal that economic 
growth reduces financial instability and the magnitude of reduction is higher in the pre-
liberalisation period compared to post-liberalisation period.  
 
For each regression, the specification of the equation was tested with the Sagan test for instrument 
validity, then tested with the serial correlation test for second order serial correlation. The test 
results suggest that the instruments used in this study are valid and there exists no evidence of 
second serial correlation in the estimates made. 
 
6. Policy Implications  
This study demonstrates how financial liberalisation and development are fundamental to financial 
stability.  There is a danger therefore, that in trying to aviod financial instability, the intervention by 
African countries’ policymakers can create rigidity or financial repression policies rather than  
facilitating a more stable financial system which could be achieved by a range of other policy 
options. For example, financial rules and regulations being designed to widen the space for the 
growth and stability of oriented marcoeconomic policies. At the same time it should be remembered 
that regulations can be problematic, in that they can themselves be the source of instability and thus 
have adverse effects on financial intermediation and development. These aspects of regulation 
should be taken into account when designing prudential and capital account regimes. The 
particularlity of each country must be considered and no one-size-fits all solution should be 
adopted. Institutions may also need to be strengthened or created before new policies  and 
regulatory measures are introduced. 
 
There should also be coordination and cooperation amongst the various public authorities  
responsible for monetary policy, regulation and supervision of the financial system. Some of these  
responsibilities may come under the same authority, this is particularly true for monetary policy. 
Financial  regulation and supervision must come under the authority of the Central Bank, which 
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must be independant of political decison making and influence, given their task of attaining stability 
in the financial system.  
 
Efforts  by African governments  should be focussed on creating an economic environment which 
facilitates and establishes a stable marcoeconomic environment with sound monetary polices, fiscal 
discipline and a peaceful political environment. They should also provide adequate institutions that 
respect property rights, and  law and order. This could  generate adequate human capital, thus 
creating a relationship between marco stability and growth that reduces uncertainty, strengthens 
credibility and improves the overall macroeconomic environment. The beneficial consequences of 
this would encourage direct foreign investment, domestic investment and accelerate the process of  
economic growth, thereby  reducing poverty. 
 
7. Conclusion and future research directions  
This paper has investigated linkages between financial instability, financial liberalisation, financial 
development and economic growth  in African countries during the period 1985 to 2010, using a 
dynamic panel method. Two main findings are established.  First, financial development and 
financial liberalisation have positive effects on financial instability. Second, economic growth 
reduces financial instability and the magnitude of reduction is higher in the pre-liberalisation period 
compared to post- liberalisation period. Future studies can improve extant literature by engaging 
cross-specific studies for more targeted policy implications. Moreover, assessing if the  established 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics  
 
Variables OBS Mean SD MIN MAX 
Index Fin. Instability  667 -2.58 0.99 -7.03 11.72 
Index Fin. Development  1010 5.25 1.11 1.56 8.23 
Growth  of GDP  1150 0.01 0.06 -0.69 0.65 
Log. GDP per Capita. 1197 6.21 1.07 4.05 9.06 
Change in Terms of trade 1150 -0.55 9.99 -107.3 42.9 
Inflation rate 1078 4.7 0.35 4.4 10.1 
Government Size 1131 2.6 0.4 0.7 3.8 
Output Gap 1197 -0.67 9.2 -139.5 33.8 
Capital Account Openness 1110 -0.67 1.08 -1.8 2.4 
Domestic credit to the private sector.  1167 19.9 21.4 0 161.9 
Liquid Liabilities  1057 3.3 0.65 -0.18 6.6 
Credit to the Private Sector 1131 2.6 0.89 -0.38 5.08 
Money and quasi Money 1150 3.2 0.63 0.77 4.7 
Real interest rate  873 9.22 31.98 -96.8 605.43 
Interest rate spread 860 20.3 43.6 0.53 261.23 
Change in domestic credit given by banks  1116 -0.07 15.25 -123.9 319.53 
Change  in credit to the private sector  1117 0.25 6.9 -80.9 102.5 
Change in Liquid Liabilities   1009 0.24 19.15 -300.5 248.19 
Change in money and quasi money (M2) as % GDP 1113 0.58 4.8 -68.9 64.9 
Change in real interest rate  824 1.09 18.15 -126.7 298.6 


























Variable Comp loading (1) Variance explained 
(2) 
Correlations (3) 
Change in domestic credit by banks 0.52 0.43 0.90 
Change in credit to the private sector 0.50 0.27 0.83 
Change in Liquid Liabilities   0.49 0.13 0.77 
Change money and quasi money (M2) as % GDP 0.46 0.06 0.67 
Change real interest rate 0.17 0.05 0.27 
Change in  interest rate spread 0.15 0.04 0.30 
Column (1) shows the component loading weight individual, column (2) shows the variance explained by the component 
model of the individual indicators, column (3) shows the correlation between the individual indicator and the component 









1985-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010 
High instability  Cameroon, Burkina Faso, 
Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Rwanda,  South 
Africa, Kenya, Morocco, 
Burkina Faso , Burundi, 
Comoros, Mauritius, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Liberia, and Cape 
Verde    
Uganda , Ethiopia , Zambia, 
Cape Verde , Namibia, South 
Africa, Mozambique, Gambia  
Mauritius, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone,  Rwanda , Guinean, 
Egypt, Comoros, Malawi, 
Senegal, and Zimbabwe      
Mozambique, Tanzania, South 
Africa, Botswana,   Cape Verde, 
Gambia, Guinea, Mauritius, 
Zimbabwe, Kenya, Egypt, 
Comoros, Ethiopia, Central 
Africa, Botswana, Namibia 
,Tanzania, Gambia, Liberia, and 
Cape Verde     
 
Moderate instability Senegal, Mauritania, Ghana, 
Mali, Niger, Gabon, Kenya, 
Cote d’ivoire, Congo, Rep. 
Burundi. Egypt, Benin, 
Morocco, Botswana, Togo, 
Chad, Sierra Leone and Guinea 
Bissau, Lesotho, Seychelles, 
Central Africa 
Rwanda, Central African 
Republic, Kenya , Togo, Benin, 
Chad, Niger, Algeria, Malawi,    
Lesotho,  Burkina Faso, Mali,  
Botswana, Tunisia, Gabon , 
Nigeria , Tanzania, Kenya 
Malawi, Comoros, Ethiopia, 
Central Africa Republic, 
Mauritius, Lesotho, Gabon, 
Cameroon,  Nigeria, Algeria, 
Madagascar, Sierra Leone, 
Congo Rep. , Djibouti , Gabon, 
Chad, Madagascar,  Rwanda, 
and Malawi 
Low instability  Tunisia, Gambia, Nigeria, 
Uganda, Zimbabwe 
Cameroon, Togo, Congo Rep, 
Algeria, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, 
and  Mauritania 
Libya, Seychelles, Zambia, 
Chad, Nigeria, Congo Rep.   
*A country is classified as high instability if it has an index great than 0. It is classified as moderate instability if it has an index less than 0. Countries with the index less than or equal to -0.25 are 






Table 6: Pairwise Correlation 
 




Fin. Dev Shock 
trade 
Inflation Gov. size GDPPC Fin.Lib. Output 
gap. 
Fin instab. 1.00         
GDPPC GR -0.105*** 1.000        
Fin.Dev 0.17*** 0.04 1.000       
Shock trade -0.013 0.05* 0.016 1.000      
Inflation -0.005 -0.21*** -0.21 -0.22 1.000     
Gov.size 0.024 0.007 0.046 0.047 -0.21 1.000    
GDPPC 0.03 0.12 0.58 0.024 0.16 0.39 1.000   
Fin.Lib 0.078 0.05 0.12 -0.0128 0.11 0.13 0.22*** 1.000  




























The effect of financial liberalisation, financial development and the economic growth on financial instability in African countries 
(1985-2010). Estimation: Dynamic Panel regression, System GMM estimation: 
 
Dependent variable: Index of financial instability  
Annual estimation 1.1 1.2 1.3 
Lag. Fin. instability  -0.12(0.43)*** -0.27(0.065)*** -0.11(0.07) 
Growth GDP -2.32(0.59)*** -2.7(1.2)* -2.64(0.69)** 
Log.GDP per cap  0.02(0.04) 0.58(0.33)* -0.077(0.05) 
Inflation 0.20(0.29) -1.01(0.78) -0.15(0.09)* 
Change in term trade -0.04(0.002) -0.001(0.003) 0.004(0.002) 
Output gap 0.02(.014)** 0.052(0.22)** 0.03(0.016)* 
Log. Gov.Size -0.05(0.16) 1.1(0.81) -0.02(0.22) 
Financial Lib. 0.39(0.15)**  0.32(0.13)** 
Financial dev.  1.8(0.73) 0.25(0.10)** 
Constant -1.07(1.1) 2.8(3.8) 2.7 (1.7) 
Serial correlation 0.242 0.233 0.184 
Sagan test 0.971 0.973 0.967 
Number of instruments 46 54 57 
Numbers of Obs 480 489 480 
Notes: the dependent variable is the index of financial instability.  The robust standard deviations are given in parentheses. ,**,*** indicate statistically  significant at the 10%, 5%  and 1% level respectively. The statistics are p-value 






Table 5: The Effect financial development and Economics Growth on Financial instability in African countries from 1985-2010, 
considering the financial liberalisation period and the non-financial liberalisation period. 
Variables Fin. Liberalisation Non-fin.Lib.years 
Lag.fin.instability 0.09(0.18) 0.24(0.49) 
Growth GDPPC -2.6(0.64)*** -3.7(1.7)** 
Real GDPPC -0.02(0.04) 0.16(0.22) 
Inflation -0.04(0.36)* 0.28(0.48) 
Change in term trade -0.003(0.002) 0.001(0.015) 
Output gap 0.032(0.007)** 0.01(0.023) 
Log. government size 0.032(0.10) -0.08(0.08) 
Financial development 0.096(0.045)** 0.26(0.14) 
Constant 2.7(1.7) -1.7(2.4) 
Serial correlation 0.5771 0.325 
Sargan test 0.1986 0.620 
Number of instruments 27 11 
Number of Obs. 242 133 
   
   
Notes: the dependent variable is the index of financial instability.  The robust standard deviations are given in parentheses. ,**,*** indicate statistically  significant at the 10%, 5%  and 1% level respectively. The statistics are p-value 
for serial correlation test. The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit non second order serial correlation. The reported statistics are p-value of Sagan/Hansen test.  
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Figure 4: Financial Instability Index and Financial Development Index  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
